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IOTA-based Directed Acyclic Graphs without
Orphans
P. Ferraro, C. King, and R. Shorten
Abstract—Directed Acylic Graphs (DAGs) are emerging as an
attractive alternative to traditional blockchain architectures for
distributed ledger technology (DLT). In particular DAG ledgers
with stochastic attachment mechanisms potentially offer many
advantages over blockchain, including scalability and faster trans-
action speeds. However, the random nature of the attachment
mechanism coupled with the requirement of protection against
double-spend transactions leaves open the possibility that not all
transactions will be eventually validated. Such transactions are
said to be orphaned, and will never be validated. Our principal
contribution is to propose a simple modification to the attachment
mechanism for the Tangle (the IOTA DAG architecture). This
modification ensures that all transactions are validated in finite
time, and preserves essential features of the popular Monte-Carlo
selection algorithm. In order to demonstrate these results we
derive a fluid approximation for the Tangle (in the limit of infinite
arrival rate) and prove that this fluid model exhibits the desired
behavior. We also present simulations which validate the results
for finite arrival rates.
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Bitcoin, and its underlying technology Blockchain [1]-[4],
have recently become a source of great debate and controversy
in both business and scientific communities. While this debate
continues to rage unabated, applications of DLT technologies
have begun to emerge across several domains. Applications
in logistics [5], banking [6], and in sharing of data [7], are
just a few of the many successes of the technology. Roughly
speaking, applications of DLT technologies have hitherto
focussed on two main areas: (i) as a means of (pseudo)
monetary payment; and (ii) for tracking goods and services
in a trustworthy manner in complex supply chains. More
recently, new application arenas for DLT have been proposed.
For example, DLT would appear to offer advantages in
applications that require the orchestration of both humans
and machines, in applications that require the orchestration
of machines and other machines, and more generally in
smart city applications, where the issues of social compliance
and the enforcement of social contracts are at the forefront
(for example discouraging traffic from breaking regulations,
parking for a limited amount of time in restricted areas,
etc.) [8]. For these types of applications DLT is seen as an
interesting enabling mechanism for a number of reasons.
First, some DLT technologies (e.g. Legicash,1 Byteball,2
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IOTA [9]) are specifically designed for high frequency
micro-trading, and in this arena may be more suitable than
systems like PayPal or Visa. For example, sometimes low
value transactions will not be processed by vendors (note:
however this is also a problem for some DLT architectures
such as Bitcoin). Second, systems like PayPal or Visa may
require a transaction fee, thus making their use in digital
deposit based systems questionable; namely, where the entire
value of the token is intended to be returned to a compliant
agent. Third, in principle, DLT tokens are more like cash than
other digital forms of payment. More specifically, transactions
are pseudo-anonymous3 because the encrypted address is less
revealing than other forms of digital payments. Card based
transactions always leave a trail of what was done and when,
and are uniquely associated with an individual, the time and
location of the spend, and the transaction item. Thus from a
privacy perspective (re. Cambridge Analytica and Facebook4),
the use of DLT is much more satisfactory than traditional
digital transactions.
Our interest in DLT stems from the question of how to enforce
social contracts in a smart city context [10]. In our prior
work we have used the Tangle [8] for a number of reasons.
First, there are no explicit transaction fees associated with
IOTA transactions, and second, IOTA is designed to support
high-frequency micro transactions. In the IOTA Tangle, newly
arrived transactions select two previous transactions to validate
via a proof of work mechanism. A key part of the Tangle
is the method for selecting these transactions. This is the
so-called tip selection procedure. To-date, two methods have
been widely discussed for tip selection. The first of these is a
random selection algorithm, whereby unvalidated transactions
are randomly chosen to be validated. The second algorithm is
based on a random walk from the interior of the graph (the
DAG) to the unvalidated transactions; this is the Monte Carlo
Markov Chain (MCMC) selection method. It has been shown
in a number of papers that the first of these methods leaves
the DAG potentially vulnerable to double spending attacks by
attackers (whereby the same token can be spent more than
once), whereas the second of these algorithms may result
in situations whereby some transactions are never validated
(orphaned transactions that are simply left behind as the DAG
grows [9]) but is less vulnerable to a double spending attack.
The intuition behind the MCMC method is that dishonest tips
are unlikely to be selected by newly arriving transactions as
3https://laurencetennant.com/papers/anonymity-iota.pdf
4https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c81zyn0888lt/facebook-cambridge-
analytica-data-scandal
2they lie on low probability random paths when the MCMC
algorithm is initialised from the interior of the DAG graph.
Thus, selecting multiple dishonest tips (necessary for the
validation of these transaction) is a very low probability event.
Our principal contribution in this note is to propose a new
hybrid tip selection algorithm that resolves the dichotomy of
double spend avoidance and orphans and results in a Tangle
where all transactions are validated in finite time. As we shall
see, our newly proposed algorithm gives rise to an IOTA
Tangle with the property that all transactions are validated in
finite time, and at the same time preserves the feature that
selection of multiple dishonest transactions is unlikely.
Specific Contribution The work presented in this manuscript
builds on a prior work in which mathematical models of the
IOTA Tangle with the random tip selection algorithm were
developed and validated. The contributions of this paper are
as follows.
• We extend the model presented in [8] to include Monte
Carlo-inspired tip selection algorithms, giving rise (in
the fluid limit) to delayed partial differential equation
(PDE) based approximations of the IOTA Tangle.
• Given the PDE model, we propose a new tip selection
algorithm, and prove that for this algorithm, and this
model, that all transactions are eventually validated.
These results are formalised as a theorem based on a PDE
fluid limit. Furthermore, we validate these predictions, and
demonstrate the efficacy of the new tip selection procedure
using a precise agent based simulation of the Tangle.
Paper structure This paper is organised as follows: Section
II provides a qualitative description of the Tangle and of
the double spending attack. Simulations show the asymptotic
behaviour of the Tangle when the Monte Carlo Markov Chain
algorithm is used. Section III discusses a hybrid selection al-
gorithm and the theorem that represents the main contribution
of the paper. Section IV describes the mathematical modelling
of the fluid limit for the Tangle, based on a set of delayed
partial differential equations. Finally, Section V summarizes
the results of this work and outlines future lines of research.
II. THE TANGLE
In this paper we are interested in a particular DLT architecture
that makes use of DAGs to achieve consensus about the
shared ledger. A DAG is a finite connected directed graph
with no directed cycles. It consists of a finite number of
vertices and directed edges, such that there is no directed path
that connects a vertex ν with itself. An example of a DAG is
depicted in Figure 1.
The Tangle is a particular instance of a DAG based DLT [9].
Its objective, according to the original paper, is to provide a
cryptocurrency for the IoT industry which has no fees and
has low energy consumption. The Tangle is basically a DAG
where each vertex or site represents a transaction (we will
use interchangably the terms site, transaction and vertex),
and where the graph represents the ledger. Before being
added to the tangle, a new transaction must first approve m
(normally two) transactions in the tangle. All yet unapproved
sites are called tips and the set of all unapproved transactions
is called the tips set. New transactions will select sites from
the tips set for approval (they are not obliged to do so but it
is reasonable to expect them to), although since the approval
process takes some time (see comments below concerning
Proof of Work), these sites may no longer be tips when the
transaction is added to the tangle. Each successful approval
is represented by an edge of the graph, where a directed
edge from site i to site j means that i directly approves j.
If there is a directed path (but not a single edge) from i to j
we say that j is indirectly approved by i (e.g., see Figure 2).
The core metric of the Tangle is the Cumulative weight of a
transaction: this value represents the total number of vertices
that approve, directly or indirectly, a given site. Figure 3
shows an example of how the Cumulative Weight changes in
time. The first transaction in the Tangle is called the genesis
site (namely, the transaction where all the tokens were sent
from the original account to all the other accounts) and all
transactions indirectly approve it (and therefore its cumulative
weight, at every time, is equal to the number of sites in the
Tangle). Furthermore, in order to prevent malicious users from
spamming the network, the approval step requires a Proof
of Work (PoW). This step is less computationally intense
than its Blockchain counterpart [12] - [15], and can be easily
carried out by common IoT devices (e.g., smartphones, smart
appliances, etc.). As mentioned above the Proof of Work
introduces a delay for new transactions before they are added
to the tangle.
In what follows, we assume that there is a simple way
to verify whether the tips selected for approval by a new
transaction are consistent with each other and with all the
sites directly or indirectly approved by them (this verification
occurs during the approval step). If verification fails, the
selection process must be re-run until a set of consistent
transactions is found. This consistency property is needed
in order to prevent malicious users from tampering with the
ledger by means of a double spending attack (this is described
in more detail in the next Section).
As a final note, to illustrate the time evolution of the Tangle,
Figure 4 shows an instance of the Tangle with three new
incoming sites (upper panel). The green block (the leftmost)
is the genesis transaction, blue blocks are transactions that
have already been approved, red blocks represent the current
tips of the Tangle and grey blocks are new incoming vertices.
Immediately after being issued, a new transaction tries to attach
itself to m (in this instance two) of the network tips (middle
panel). If any of the selected tips was inconsistent with the
previous transactions, or with each other, the selection would
be rejected and the process would be performed again, until
two consistent sites are found. Notice that at this stage, the
newly arrived transactions are carrying out the required PoW,
31
2
3
4
5
10
11
7
9
6
8
Fig. 1. Example of a DAG with 11 vertices and 10 edges. All the vertices
are directed and it is impossible to find a path that connects any vertex with
itself.
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Fig. 2. Transaction 8 directly approves 5 and 6. It indirectly approves 1, 2
and 3. It does not approve 4 and 7.
and that the tips remain unconfirmed (dashed lines) until this
process is over. Once the PoW is finished, the selected tips
become confirmed sites and the grey blocks are added to the
tips set (lower panel).
A. Double Spending Attack and Tips Selection Algorithms
A double spending attack is an attempt to exploit the structure
of the DLT in order to spend the same digital token multiple
times.
To see how a double spending attack might be carried out
on the Tangle, let us consider a specific example to explain
with more detail the process of approval. Figure 5 shows an
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Fig. 3. Representation of the evolution of the Cumulative weight of three
sites as three new transactions enter the Tangle
instance of the Tangle. A malicious user sent a certain amount
of currency to a merchant. The corresponding transaction is
the yellow site. The same user, afterwards, produces other
transactions, where she spends again the same tokens that
were sent to the merchant. These correspond to the green
blocks. It is worth mentioning, at this point, that there is
no mechanism to force a user to select certain sites for
approval: any transaction can be considered for selection.
Nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority
of users would have little interest in targeting specific sites
for approval and would instead follow the tips selection
algorithm that the main protocol proposes. In this scenario,
all the transactions that approve the original yellow site (the
blue blocks) are incompatible with the green ones, therefore
any new transactions can either approve the green/black sites
or the blue/black ones. The green/blue combination would
be considered invalid (as there is an inconsistency in the
ledger) and a new selection would be made. The objective
of a hypothetical attacker would be then to wait for the
merchant to accept their payment, receive their goods, then
create one or more double spending transactions that get
approved by other honest sites. It is not possible for two
conflicting branches of the Tangle to both continue growing
indefinitely (for a formal proof on the subject see [8]).
Therefore it follows that, if the attacker succeeds in their
attempt, the main Tangle will continue to grow from the
illegitimate double spending transaction, and the legitimate
branch with the original payment to the merchant will be
orphaned, meaning that its sites will not be approved by
new transactions. The success probability of such an attack
depends on the particular selection algorithm employed and,
as mentioned in the previous Section, two algorithms have
4Fig. 4. Sequence to issue a new transaction. The green site represents the
genesis block, the blue sites represent the approved transactions and the red
ones represent the tips. The black edges represent approvals, whereas the
dashed ones represent transactions that are performing the PoW in order to
approve two tips.
been proposed so far:
• Random Selection Algorithm: The Random Selection
(RS) algorithm selects m (generally two) tips randomly
from the pool of all possible tips. The upper panel of
Figure 6 shows an illustrative example of this procedure.
This algorithm, due to its simplicity, makes the Tangle
vulnerable to double spending attacks. The interested
reader can refer to [9] for a detailed discussion on this
topic.
• Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm: The Markov
Chain Monte Carlo Selection Algorithm (MCMC)
Fig. 5. The blue and the green transactions are incompatible with each other.
works in a slightly more elaborate way than its random
counterpart. In the MCMC algorithm m (generally two)
independent random walks are created on the tangle;
the walks start at the genesis transaction and move
along edges of the tangle. The jumping probability
from transaction j to transaction k is proportional to
f(−α(ϑj − ϑk)), where f(·) is a monotonic increasing
function (generally an exponential), α is a positive
constant and ϑi represents the Cumulative Weight
of transaction i. The jumping process stops when
the particle reaches a tip, which is then selected for
approval. The lower panel of Figure 6 shows an example
of the paths of two walks in this selection procedure.
The main difference with the RS algorithm lies in the
use of the graph structure: an attacker would need to
create enough transactions, with cumulative weights
equal to or larger than the cumulative weight of the main
DAG, in order to make the double spending successful.
This, in turn, would require the malicious user to
possess an amount of computational power comparable
to the network of honest users. The interested reader
can find more details on this topic in [9] [16].
The goal of the MCMC algorithm is to increase (and
ultimately ensure) the security of the Tangle against double
spending attacks performed by malicious users. The algorithm
and its security from attacks can be tuned using the parameter
α: high values of α increase the probability that the particle
will jump to the transactions with the largest available
cumulative weight (as α approaches ∞ the particles will
move in a deterministic way), whereas lower values of α
make the algorithm and its output more unpredictable (as the
cumulative weights matter less and the jumping probability
tends to become uniform as α approaches zero). A good way
of picturing the effects of this parameter is by comparing it
5Fig. 6. Representation of the two main tips selection algorithms: the upper panel shows an instance of the Random Selection algorithm whereas the lower one
presents a possible example of the Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithm
to the inverse temperature of a gas: the smaller the value of
α the warmer the gas and vice-versa.
It would seem intuitive that in order to ensure the security
of the Tangle the best strategy would be to use the MCMC
algorithm with a very large value for α, leading to approval
for only the most reliable tips (since the ones at the end of
the most likely paths would be chosen by the MCMC walk).
Unfortunately, this approach would also mean that a very large
number of honest tips would never be approved: indeed large α
would imply that newly arrived transactions would select with
higher probability a small group of tips (the ones which can
be reached along paths where the cumulative weight decreases
slowly between successive sites on the path). As time passes an
unselected tip would be even less likely to be selected since
its distance from the genesis would not increase, while the
cumulative weight of sites along a path connecting it to the
genesis would increase. This outcome is undesirable because
it implies that the majority of the transactions would never get
approved. However if small values of α are used, so that most
honest tips get eventually approved, then the security against
double spending attacks would be compromised. To the best
of the authors’ knowledge, the only solution proposed so far to
this issue is to find a value of α that represents a compromise
between the system throughput and its security [16]. To verify
that these behaviours do in fact occur we use an agent based
simulation of the Tangle: at each time step a random number
of transactions arrive, and for each one of these transactions
the tip selection algorithm (the MCMC in this scenario) is
performed on the current tips set in order to generate graph
structures equivalent to the ones presented in detail in Section
II. In other words, this agent based model simulates the
behaviour of each transaction, therefore providing an accurate
replica of the mechanism described in Section II. We suppose
that at every time step the number of new transactions is
generated according to a Poisson process with parameter λ and
that the PoW for the approval procedure of a tip takes h time
steps to complete. The variable of interest is the number of tips
L(t), which is the number of transactions present in the tips
set at the end of each time step. Due to the stochastic nature
of the Tangle, 50 Monte Carlo simulations are performed in
order to obtain meaningful results.
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Fig. 7. 50 realizations of the Tangle with the MCMC selection algorithm.
The system’s parameter are λ = 30, h = 5, α = 0.1
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Fig. 8. 50 realizations of the Tangle with the MCMC selection algorithm.
The system’s parameter are λ = 30, h = 5, α = 0.001
Accordingly, Figures 7 and 8 show that for α = 0.01 the
number of tips diverges with time, whereas for α = 0.0001
it fluctuates around a constant value. Clearly, these are only
two examples of the possible instances of the Tangle as
α varies. From a general point of view, it is very hard to
find, in advance, a good trade-off value to make the Tangle
simultaneously stable and secure. The Tangle’s behaviour
depends heavily on parameters such as the rate of arrivals
of new transactions and the time needed to complete the PoW .
III. MCMC-LIKE TIP SELECTION WITHOUT ORPHANS
As these simulations of the MCMC algorithm illustrate, there
is a tension between the need to protect the Tangle against
double spending attacks, and the need to ensure that all
transactions eventually get approved. For high values of α
the MCMC algorithm favours longer paths from the starting
site to the terminal tip, and so the probability of selecting
older tips decreases with time, as the paths to these older tips
do not grow. Hence the number of unapproved tips continues
to grow, and with time the probability of selection for older
tips decreases to the point that it becomes impossible for old
tips to be selected. By contrast small values of α allow older
tips to be selected, however at the same time leaving the
Tangle vulnerable to double spending attacks. This motivates
the search for new tip selection algorithms that are not easily
exploitable and for which all tips eventually get approved. In
this section we propose one such new algorithm, which we
call the hybrid selection algorithm.
In order to combine the best properties of the two scenarios
(large and small α), we propose the following hybrid selection
algorithm, which can be divided conceptually into two steps:
• Security Step: the first set of selections is made using
the MCMC algorithm with a high value of α. This is
done to protect security by ensuring that honest tips get
selected preferentially;
• Swipe Step: the set of second selections is performed
using a different algorithm: it can be a RS or a MCMC
with a low value of α. This step serves the purpose of
taking care of the older transactions that are not likely
to be selected by the first step.
Roughly speaking, the Security Step takes care of the security
of the system, whereas the purpose of the Swipe Step is to
ensure that no tips get left behind by the first, more accurate,
selection.
Figure 9 shows the dynamics of the number of tips L(t) under
the hybrid selection algorithm. Note that the values for α and
λ in this simulation are higher than the unstable simulations
performed in Section II. The selection procedure, while being
as safe from double spending attacks as any Tangle with high
values of α, also ensures that eventually all tips get approved,
thus confirming the theoretical result presented in this section.
In the next section we present a mathematical model for the
dynamics of the Tangle under various tip selection algorithms,
in the regime of high arrival rate (also known as the fluid
limit). Within this model we formulate and prove a result that
demonstrates stability of the size of the tip set when the hybrid
algorithm is used.
IV. MATHEMATICS OF THE DAG: A FLUID LIMIT
We now present, on the basis of some of the results obtained
in [8], a mathematical model that approximates the Tangle
behaviour with large arrival rate, taking into account the
mechanics discussed in the previous Section.
The Tangle can be described as an increasing family of
DAG’s, {G(t), t > 0} where each site of G(t) contains the
record of a transaction which arrived at or before time t. We
are interested in describing the growth of the Tangle G(t) in
a situation where one central server keeps the record of all
the transactions. In a real network there would be multiple
local copies of the Tangle, and each user would independently
update its own copy. However due to synchronization issues,
the presence of multiple independent servers complicates the
analysis; therefore, we assume the simpler scenario with one
main server, and multiple users accessing it whenever they
7want to issue a transaction.
We assume that each newly created transaction selects m ≥ 2
tips for approval, and attempts to validate them (note that
m = 2 in the standard Tangle). If validation fails the choices
are discarded and another m tips are selected for validation.
This continues until the process is successful, and we assume
that this whole validation effort is essentially instantaneous.
However after the validation there is a fixed waiting period
h during which the PoW is carried out and the transaction
is communicated to the server where the Tangle is stored.
During this time the approvals of the selected tips are pending,
so the tips may still be available for selection by other new
transactions. After the waiting time h, new directed edges are
added to the graph, directed from the new site (corresponding
to the new transaction) to its m parent sites (corresponding to
the m tips which were successfully validated). After this point
the m parent sites are no longer tips, and so are no longer
available for selection by other new transactions. However it
may happen that some of these sites had already ceased to be
tips at an earlier time, due to their being validated by some
other new transaction.
To facilitate the discussion in the sequel, we consider a general
algorithm for selecting the tips for validation. Letting L(t)
denote the set of tips at time t, we assume that there are
m probability distributions Q(j)(t) = {Q
(j)
b (t) : b ∈ L(t)}
(j = 1, . . . ,m) defined on the set of tips at time t. The
newly created transaction selects the first tip for approval using
Q(1)(t), selects the second tip using Q(2)(t), and so on to the
mth tip. These probability distributions are continually updated
as the tangle grows.
The model involves these variables:
1) L(t) is the set of tips at time t
2) W(t) is the set of ‘pending’ tips at time t which are
being considered for approval by some new transaction
3) X (t) = L(t) \W(t) is the set of ‘free’ tips at time t
4) L(t) = |L(t)|, W (t) = |W(t)|, X(t) = |X (t)|
5) Ta is the time when transaction a is created, and the
PoW starts
6) Ta + h is the time when the PoW ends, and the
transaction a is added to the tangle
7) N(t) is the number of transactions created up to time t
8) |G(t)| = N(t− h) is the size of the DAG at time t
9) U(Ta) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} is the number of free tips
selected for approval by transaction a at time Ta
We have the relations
N(t) =
∑
a:Ta≤t
1 (1)
W (t) =
∑
a:t−h<Ta≤t
U(Ta) (2)
X(t) = N(t− h)−
∑
a:Ta≤t
U(Ta) (3)
L(t) = N(t− h)−
∑
a:Ta+h≤t
U(Ta) (4)
U(Ta) is a random variable whose distribution depends on the
sets X (Ta), W(Ta) and L(Ta), as well as the distributions
{Q(j)(Ta)}. (Note: we assume that variables are updated at
the times {Ta} and {Ta+ h} so U(Ta) really depends on the
values just before time Ta. For convenience we will ignore
this distinction in our notation). Let R
(j)
b (Ta) be the indicator
variable of the event that b is the jth tip selected by the new
transaction a. Since tips are selected independently, and the
same tip may be selected multiple times, we have
U(Ta) =
∑
b∈X (t)

1−
m∏
j=1
(
1−R
(j)
b (Ta)
) (5)
It follows that the expected value is
E[U(Ta)] =
∑
b∈X (t)

1−
m∏
j=1
(
1−Q
(j)
b (Ta)
) (6)
A. Tip selection algorithms
We will consider a class of selection distributions which are
modeled on two well-studied examples from the literature. The
first example is the random tip selection algorithm, where the
distribution Q(ran) is uniform over the tip set L(t). In this case
Q
(ran)
b (t) =
1
L(t)
(7)
and it follows that
P(select a free tip at time t with Q(ran)) =
X(t)
L(t)
(8)
The second example is the MCMC attachment algorithm which
selects tips by generating a random walk along paths in the
Tangle from the genesis to the tips. The algorithm is designed
to favor paths where the change in accumulated weight at each
step is small. This feature tends to favor paths where each site
was approved relatively soon after being added to the Tangle:
if a tip had to wait a long time before it was approved, then
its parent sites in the Tangle would have been more likely to
accumulate a higher weight while the tip was waiting, which
would have led to a larger change in accumulated weight at the
step from parent to child. Thus the MCMC algorithm will tend
to favor tips which are relatively newly added to the Tangle.
Because the MCMC algorithm generates a complicated prob-
ability distribution on the tips which depends on the detailed
structure of the DAG, we will model it with a simpler class of
distribution which we believe captures important features of
the MCMC distribution. We define the age of a tip to be the
time since the tip was added to the Tangle. As argued above,
the MCMC algorithm will generate a distribution which is
biased toward tips with smaller age, and thus a suitably age-
biased distribution should provide a reasonable model for the
behavior of the MCMC algorithm. So we assume that there
is a positive function g(·) such that the MCMC distribution
Q(MC)(t) has the form
Q
(MC)
b (t) = P(select tip b at time t with MCMC)
= Z(t)−1 g(t− Tb − h) (9)
8where Ta+h was the time when the tip was first added to the
Tangle, so t− Ta− h is the tip’s current age, and where Z(t)
is the normalization factor
Z(t) =
∑
b∈L(t)
g(t− Tb − h) (10)
We then have
P(select a free tip at time t with Q(MC))
=
∑
b∈X (t)
Z(t)−1 g(t− Tb − h)
=
∑
b∈X (t) g(t− Tb − h)∑
b∈L(t) g(t− Tb − h)
(11)
We will consider tip selection algorithms of the form (9) where
g is a general positive function. So we consider functions
g1, . . . , gm, and following (9) define for j = 1, . . . ,m
Q
(j)
b (t) = Zj(t)
−1 gj(t− Tb − h), (12)
Zj(t) =
∑
b∈L(t)
gj(t− Tb − h) (13)
This class encompasses the random tip selection algorithm (in
which case g is constant) as well as the proxy model for
the MCMC algorithm. In the case of the MCMC algorithm
the weighting provided by the age-biased factor g(·) will
concentrate the distribution on recent arrivals, and thus we
will assume that, for MCMC-like distributions, for at least for
some values of the parameter α, the function g is integrable,
that is ∫ ∞
0
g(s) ds <∞ (14)
Note that the condition (14) will not hold true for the random
tip selection algorithm.
B. The fluid model
We consider the regime of high arrival rate, where the growth
of the Tangle is described by a fluid model. We will present
some plausible arguments to describe the dynamics of the tip
set at high arrival rate, and use these to derive the fluid limit.
We assume a Poisson arrival process with rate λ, so that the
fluid limit corresponds to λ → ∞. We rescale variables by
λ−1 and define the rescaled numbers of tips to be
l(t) = lim
λ→∞
λ−1 L(t), (15)
x(t) = lim
λ→∞
λ−1X(t), (16)
w(t) = lim
λ→∞
λ−1W (t) (17)
For a fixed age s > 0, the number of tips at time t with ages
between s and s+ δ is
#{a ∈ L(t) : s ≤ t− Ta − h ≤ s+ δ} (18)
In the fluid limit we assume that this quantity grows propor-
tionally to λ δ, so we define the density l(t, s) as
l(t, s) =
lim
λ→∞
δ→0
(λ δ)
−1
#{a ∈ L(t) : s ≤ t− Ta − h ≤ s+ δ} (19)
Then the total number of tips at time t (after re-scaling by
λ−1) is
l(t) =
∫ t−h
0
l(t, s) ds (20)
(note that s ≤ t−h since we assume that no tips arrived before
time h). We make similar assumptions about the numbers of
pending tips and free tips, and define age-dependent densities
w(t, s) and x(t, s) in a similar way.
Note that each new transaction selectsm tips for approval, and
some of these may not be free (due to having been selected by
earlier transactions). Therefore at time t the number of pending
tips W (t) is at most m times the number of new transactions
created in the interval [t− h, t]. In the fluid limit this implies
the bound
w(t) ≤ mh (21)
Over a small time interval (t, t+ ǫ) the number of arrivals will
be λ ǫ, and these arrivals will select tips for approval according
to the distributions {Q(j)(t)} defined in (12). Using (6), it
follows that the expected number of tips selected by this group
of arrivals which lie in the age range s to s+ǫ is approximately
λ ǫ
∑
b∈L(t):
s≤t−Tb−h≤s+ǫ

1−
m∏
j=1
(
1−Q
(j)
b (t)
) (22)
Similarly the expected number of free tips in the age range s
to s+ ǫ selected by this group of arrivals is
λ ǫ
∑
b∈X(t):
s≤t−Tb−h≤s+ǫ

1−
m∏
j=1
(
1−Q
(j)
b (t)
) (23)
Now we consider the evolution of the density of free tips in the
age range (s, s+ ǫ) between times t and t+ ǫ. After rescaling
by λ−1, the number of these tips at time t is (approximately)
x(t, s)ǫ, and we will compare this with the number at time
t + ǫ. During this time increment ǫ the subset of tips of age
(s, s+ ǫ) inherits the tips from the age range (s− ǫ, s) while
it also loses some tips due to the selection by new arrivals, as
detailed above in (23). Thus the evolution is
x(t+ ǫ, s) ǫ = x(t, s− ǫ) ǫ
−
∑
b∈X(t):
s≤t−Tb−h≤s+ǫ

1−
m∏
j=1
(
1−Q
(j)
b (t)
) (24)
9Furthermore for the jth tip selection we have
Zj(t) =
∑
b∈L(t)
gj(t− Tb − h)
=
∑
k≥1
∑
b∈L(t):
(k−1)ǫ≤t−Tb−h<kǫ
gj(t− Tb − h)
≃
∑
k≥1
gj(kǫ)λ l(t, kǫ) ǫ
≃ λ
∫ t−h
0
gj(s) l(t, s) ds (25)
We define
ζj(t) =
∫ t−h
0
gj(s) l(t, s) ds (26)
then we also have
∑
b∈X(t):
s≤t−Tb−h≤s+ǫ

1−
m∏
j=1
(
1−Q
(j)
b (t)
)
≃
∑
b∈X(t):
s≤t−Tb−h≤s+ǫ

1−
m∏
j=1
(
1− λ−1
gj(s)
ζj(t)
)
≃ λx(t, s) ǫ

1−
m∏
j=1
(
1− λ−1
gj(s)
ζj(t)
)

= ǫ x(t, s)
m∑
j=1
gj(s)
ζj(t)
+O(λ−1) (27)
Thus in the limit λ→∞ the evolution equation (24) becomes
x(t+ ǫ, s) = x(t, s− ǫ)− ǫ x(t, s)
m∑
j=1
gj(s)
ζj(t)
(28)
and hence in the limit ǫ→ 0 we get
∂x
∂t
(t, s) +
∂x
∂s
(t, s) = −x(t, s)
m∑
j=1
gj(s)
ζj(t)
(29)
This delay equation holds for s > 0. At s = 0 the number
of free tips is continually replenished at the rate λ, as trans-
actions complete the approval process. Hence (29) must be
supplemented with the boundary condition
x(t, 0) = 1. (30)
The dynamical equation for the pending tips can be derived in
a similar way. The density w(t, s) receives the outflow from
x(t, s), so for 0 ≤ s ≤ h we have
∂w
∂t
(t, s) +
∂w
∂s
(t, s) = x(t, s)
m∑
j=1
gj(s)
ζj(t)
(31)
For s > h there is also an outflow from w due to approval by
new transactions which were created at time t− h and which
selected some of these tips for validation, so for s > h we
have
∂w
∂t
(t, s) +
∂w
∂s
(t, s) = x(t, s)
m∑
j=1
gj(s)
ζj(t)
−x(t− h, s− h)
m∑
j=1
gj(s− h)
ζj(t− h)
(32)
Define
θ(u) =
{
0 for u < 0
1 for u ≥ 0
(33)
Noting that l(t, s) = x(t, s) + w(t, s) we get
∂l
∂t
(t, s) +
∂l
∂s
(t, s) =
−x(t− h, s− h)
m∑
j=1
gj(s− h)
ζj(t− h)
θ(s− h) (34)
and again this is supplemented by the initial condition
l(t, 0) = 1. (35)
In summary: we have the following system of dynamical equations
for the tip densities in the fluid limit:
∂x
∂t
(t, s) +
∂x
∂s
(t, s) = −x(t, s)
m∑
j=1
gj(s)
ζj(t)
(36)
∂l
∂t
(t, s) +
∂l
∂s
(t, s) = −x(t− h, s− h)
m∑
j=1
gj(s− h)
ζj(t− h)
θ(s− h)
with boundary conditions
x(t, 0) = l(t, 0) = 1 (37)
and where
ζj(t) =
∫ t−h
0
gj(s) l(t, s) ds (38)
These equations are deterministic and describe the mean-field be-
havior of the system. Therefore they provide information about the
average behavior of the Tangle in the regime of large arrival rate.
Note that these are delay equations and so must be supplemented
with additional initial conditions, namely in order to determine the
solution the functions {x(t, s), l(t, s)} must be provided for all
0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ h. Also note that, since we are interested in physically
meaningful solutions of (36) (e.g., solutions that satisfy (21)), we
assume that (36) admits, at least, one solution {l(t, s), x(t, s)}, such
that l, x ∈ C1(R× R+).
C. Integrable weights: persistence of orphans
In this section we consider the case where all the weight functions
are integrable, that is∫ ∞
0
gj(s) ds <∞, j = 1, . . . ,m (39)
For example this situation is expected to hold when tips are selected
using the MCMC algorithm with a sufficiently large value of α, as our
simulations in a previous section show. We will show that orphans
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must persist in this situation, meaning that the set of unapproved tips
must grow without bound.
Theorem 1. Suppose (39) holds, and assume also that the solution
{l(t, s), x(t, s)} of the system (36) converges as t → ∞ (so that
the Tangle converges to an equilibrium average behavior, such that
∂x
∂t
(t, s) = ∂l
∂t
(t, s) = 0). Let l(s) = limt→∞ l(t, s), x(s) =
limt→∞ x(t, s), then∫ ∞
0
l(s)ds =
∫ ∞
0
x(s)ds =∞ (40)
Proof: Define
ζj =
∫ ∞
0
gj(s) l(s) ds (41)
Time independence of x(s) and l(s) implies from (36) that
dx
ds
(s) = −x(s)
m∑
j=1
gj(s)
ζj
dl
ds
(s) = −x(s− h)
m∑
j=1
gj(s− h)
ζj
θ(s− h)
x(0) = 1 (42)
l(0) = 1 (43)
It follows immediately that l(s) = l(0) = 1 for 0 ≤ s ≤ h, and that
l(s) = x(s− h) for s ≥ h (44)
Furthermore l(s) is decreasing and so
ζj ≤
∫ ∞
0
gj(s) l(0) ds <∞ j = 1, . . . ,m (45)
The solution of (42) is
x(s) = exp
[
−
m∑
j=1
ζ
−1
j
∫ s
0
gj(u)du
]
(46)
and thus it follows that
lim
s→∞
x(s) = exp
[
−
m∑
j=1
ζ
−1
j
∫ ∞
0
gj(u)du
]
> 0 (47)
Therefore
lim
s→∞
∫ s
0
x(u) du =∞ (48)
Since l(s) ≥ x(s) this also implies that l(s) is not integrable.
Remark: as noted before, Theorem 1 implies that when all tip se-
lection algorithms are ’short-range’, meaning that all selections favor
more recently arrived transactions, the number of orphan transactions
must grow without bound.
D. Random tip selection: eventual approval of all transactions
We now consider the situation where at least two of the tips are
selected randomly, meaning that the corresponding weight functions
are constant. Without loss of generality these can be the first two tip
selections, so we assume
g1(s) = g2(s) = 1 (49)
We state and prove a Theorem which shows that in this situation the
number of unapproved tips remains bounded as the Tangle grows.
This is in contrast to the situation with integrable weight functions,
where the pool of unapproved tips continues to grow without bound.
Theorem 2. Let {x(t, s), l(t, s)} be a solution of the system (36),
and assume that (21) and (49) hold. Then l(t) is uniformly bounded
for all t ≥ 0.
Proof: applying (49) to (36) we get for t ≥ h
∂x
∂t
(t, s) +
∂x
∂s
(t, s) ≤ −
2x(t, s)
l(t)
(50)
Recall that
x(t) =
∫ t−h
0
x(t, s)ds (51)
and therefore
dx
dt
= x(t, t− h) +
∫ t−h
0
∂x
∂t
(t, s) ds (52)
Also we have∫ t−h
0
∂x
∂s
(t, s) ds = x(t, t− h)− x(t, 0) = x(t, t− h) − 1 (53)
Therefore integrating over s in the inequality (50) we get
dx
dt
≤ 1− 2
x(t)
l(t)
(54)
Furthermore we have l(t) = x(t)+w(t) and thus from (21) we derive
l(t) ≤ x(t) +mh (55)
Substituting into (54), it gives
dx
dt
≤ 1− 2
x(t)
x(t) +mh
(56)
It follows from (56) that
dx
dt
(t) < 0 for x(t) > mh (57)
Recall that the values {x(t)} for 0 ≤ t ≤ h are set by the initial
conditions. Therefore from (57) we deduce
sup
t≥0
x(t) ≤ max{mh, sup
0≤u≤h
x(u)} (58)
Since l(t) ≤ x(t) +mh this proves that l(t) is uniformly bounded.
Remark: assuming that the distribution of tips approaches an equilib-
rium as t→∞, the result that l(t) is uniformly bounded means that
the density of tips at age s converges to zero as s→∞. This means
that, except possibly for a transient set of tips created by the initial
conditions, all tips will be eventually approved under the assumptions
of Theorem 2. We conjecture that the same result holds under the
weaker assumption that at least one of the tips is randomly selected.
This conjecture would imply that l(t) is uniformly bounded for our
hybrid algorithm where one tip is selected randomly, and the other tip
is selected by the MCMC algorithm. Our simulations of the Tangle
presented in Section II support this conjecture. Notice that in these
simulations the number of tips L(t) diverges or converges depending
on the size of the parameter α (in the proposed model changing α is
equivalent to changing the function g(·): larger α is closer to MCMC,
smaller α is closer to the random tip selection model). This supports
our contention that the PDE model is consistent and matches the
behavior of the agent based model of the Tangle.
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Fig. 9. 50 realizations of the Tangle with the hybrid selection algorithm. The
system’s parameter are λ = 40, h = 5, α = 1
Remark: As a final note, even if the hybrid selection algorithm
described so far protects the Tangle from orphaned transactions, it
might still leave it vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
As dishonest transactions get issued and not selected, they will
accumulate: if their quantity increases to the point that they outnumber
honest sites then due to the RS algorithm the selection tip algorithm
might need to be repeated multiple times (due to the incompatibility
between the swipe selection and the security selection), thus slowing
the whole network, or even bringing it to a standstill.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we develop a new tip selection algorithm that ensure
that all honest transactions get eventually approved, while at the
same time preserves the basic properties of the MCMC tip-selection
algorithm. A fluid approximation of the new IOTA Dag is derived,
and the mathematical predictions of this model, under reasonable
assumptions, are found to be consistent with the desired properties
of the new tip-selection procedure. Future work will be focused on
modifications of the hybrid selection algorithm in order to remove
the threat denial of service attacks.
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